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Abstract
In this paper data from a school survey in India is used to ask if there is evidence for the 
payment of performance related pay and whether such pay structures do impact on student 
achievement. It is shown that - after controlling for student ability, parental background and 
the resources available - private schools get significantly better academic results by relating 
pay to achievement; government schools do not.  We discuss possible interpretations of this 
result.
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1 Introduction
Teachers are a central actor in the learning process that takes place in schools, and teachers’ 
attitudes and effectiveness can vary depending on the incentives they face.  Pay structure is 
potentially an important incentive-tool in the hands of the education policy maker and merit 
pay  proposals  have  recently  been  discussed  in  several  countries  and  applied  in  some. 
However, the issue of whether linking teachers’ pay to student performance is an effective 
means of improving that performance has been contentious in educational debates. 
Malcomson (1999, p. 2337) in surveying the literature on contract design with respect 
to performance related pay notes that “the objective measures of performance available are 
often  such  poor  measures  of  the  performance  firms  really  care  about  that  use  of  formal 
performance related pay schemes can be counterproductive”. Problems arise from the ability of 
agents to influence the output measures and the fact that  non-measured outputs may be as 
important as measurable ones. However, in the case of teaching, it may be relatively easy to 
verify outcomes, if exams can measure output and the local teachers are not allowed to mark 
the exams.  But verifying  whether  teacher  inputs affect  outcomes may still  be problematic. 
Students may be taught by more than one teacher so it will be difficult to link the performance 
of a particular student to a teacher. Schools differ greatly in the background and quality of their 
intakes so that  exam performance outcomes,  which do not control  for such student-quality 
differences, are worthless as a basis for differential payments to teachers.   These are some of 
the reasons advanced for resisting performance related pay in the education sector. 
However, Ballou (2001, p.57) calls into question the notion that teaching is inherently 
unsuited to performance-based pay. He uses data from the US to show that private schools 
make significantly greater use of merit pay than do public school, even when the comparison is 
restricted to public systems that most resemble private schools with respect to their size and the 
type  of students  served.   He argues that  the reasons for  the absence of merit  pay are  not 
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inherent in the teaching technology, but are due to specific circumstances in public education, 
notably the opposition of teacher unions. In Britain, while many individual teachers supported 
the recent introduction of a weak form of performance related pay, the teacher unions have 
mostly been against it on the grounds that it would create conflict and division among teachers 
within any given school, undermining collegiality and mutual cooperation.  They also argue 
that it may lead to the exclusion of less able children from school since test results of students 
will be taken into account in the assessment of merit pay. 
The result of any such selectivity would be to set up a positive correlation between 
teacher pay and student achievement. The logic of the case for performance related pay is that 
improved student achievement  causes a  rise in pay which,  in turn,  through greater teacher 
effort, causes improved student outcomes. In this paper we draw on data from both private and 
government schools to attempt to assess whether there is a causal relationship between pay and 
performance or, as the selectivity argument implies, there is simply a correlation induced by 
both variables being correlated with some other factor. 
A very large literature, for both developed and developing countries, has investigated 
the impact  of dimensions  of school quality on educational  achievement.   Hanushek (1986) 
reviews 147 such achievement production function studies from developed countries and Fuller 
(1986) reviews 72 such studies from developing countries. More recent studies of the effects of 
school inputs on student outcomes include Case and Deaton (1999); Angrist and Lavy (1999); 
Hanushek,  Kain,  and  Rivkin  (1999);  Betts  and  Morell  (1999);  Hanushek  et.  al.  (1996); 
Kingdon (1996a); and Glewwe and Jacoby (1994). Some of these studies have investigated the 
impact  of teacher  salaries on student outcomes,  with mixed results.  Loeb and Page (2000) 
focus on explaining why several studies have failed to discover a positive relation between 
teacher  pay  and  student  outcomes.   To  our  knowledge,  few  have  addressed  the  issue  of 
endogeneity in the positive correlation between pay and achievement, and none appear to have 
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the data that enables a direct comparison of the effect, for similarly aged children, across the 
private and government sectors.  
Even  if  causality  is  established  as  running  from higher  wage  to  improved  student 
achievement,  the relationship  is  open to  alternative  interpretations.   One is  that  a  positive 
impact from wages onto achievement reflects the fact that higher wages likely attract better 
quality people into the pool for applicants for teaching jobs.  A second interpretation is that 
higher  pay  raises  achievement  by  raising  the  effort  of  existing  teachers.   In  terms  of  the 
efficiency wage theory, better paid teachers are likely to work harder in order to increase the 
chances  of  retaining  their  more  valuable  jobs.   The  paper  will  test  these  alternative 
explanations of the wage effect on pupil achievement.
This paper does three things.  Firstly, it examines whether teacher pay is responsive to 
measures of student performance, i.e. whether schools pay teachers performance related pay. 
Secondly, it asks whether higher teacher pay does raise student learning outcomes.  Thirdly, it 
considers the interpretations that can be given to the results.  The data and model are set out in 
section  2.  Whether  teacher  pay is  related  to  performance  and the  determinants  of  student 
achievement are the subject of section 3. Section 4 considers whether unobserved variables are 
an important influence on the results.  In section 5 we assess possible interpretations which can 
be given to the results. A final section concludes.
2 The model and data 
The data is drawn from a survey of pupils and schools in India where public and private school 
sectors have developed in parallel. The survey collected detailed information on students, their 
teachers and on various aspects of the school. The dataset was designed to collect information 
on student, teacher and school quality as well as measuring the factors which determines the 
outcome for wages and student achievement. Our model consists of two equations: an earnings 
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function for teacher’s pay and a production function for student achievement. We outline both 
before turning to the data.
The estimate of wage is to be obtained from an earnings function for government and 
private school teachers of the following form:
(1) Ln wkj =  β0 +  β1Hkj +  β2 Ln QTkj  +  β3 Skj  +  β4 Ln QSj   +  β5 Ln Aj   +  ukj
where wkj is the gross wage of the kth teacher in the jth school. This measure of earnings is 
explained by vectors of variables capturing teacher human capital (Hkj), teacher quality (QTkj), 
teacher status (Skj), school quality (QSj,) and the average achievement of students taught by the 
teacher  (Aj).   It  is  the  significance  of  this  last  variable  which  tests  for  the  existence  of 
performance related pay. We detail below, after we have introduced the data, how we propose 
to measure these dimensions of human capital and quality. 
We next present our achievement function, analogous to a firm production function.    
(2) Ln Aij =  α0  +  α1 Ln Rij  +  α2 Ln QCij  +  α3 Ln QPij  +  α4 Ln QSj  +  α5 Ln wj  +  vij
where Aij is the achievement score of the ith student in the jth school as measured in terms of 
scores on tests  of numeracy and literacy.  It  is  a  direct  measure of output.  Achievement  is 
modeled as being determined by student ability, Rij; a vector of variables capturing the student 
and parental attributes, QCij  and QPij respectively; the quality of the school QSj; and finally the 
wage of the teacher, wj.  It is the significance of the wage term in this equation which tests if 
teacher’s wages do impact on achievement. 
The data set consists of 902 students surveyed across 20 government-funded and 10 
private schools, and a sample of 172 teachers.1 The survey collected data on the personal and 
household characteristics of all students of class 8 (13-14 year olds) in the sample schools and 
1 Within the government total, 10 were junior and 10 secondary schools. Within the private sector 5 were 
junior and 5 were secondary schools. We have included aided schools within the government sector because the 
state government determines one set of salary scales for both these school types and the state exchequer pays the 
centrally determined salaries of teachers in both these school types throughout the state. Private schools, on the 
other  hand,  are  financially  autonomous,  receive  no  government  assistance,  and  set  their  own  pay  levels 
individually.  The survey was carried out in 1991.
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detailed  teacher  information  on  only  those  teachers  who taught  the  sample  class.  Table  1 
describes the variables which we use to model the determinants of wages and achievement. 
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations  of the variables used in the teacher  pay 
regression.   Table  3  gives  similar  descriptive  statistics  for  variables  used  in  the  student 
achievement function.
Table  2  divides  the  teachers  according  to  private  and  government  schools.   Our 
measure of pay is the total monthly wage payments made to the teacher. On average, wages in 
private schools are 38% lower than those in government-funded schools2.  Despite this, private 
school teachers had marginally greater mean number of years of schooling and better results 
(divisions)  in  their  own  board  and  degree  examinations,  though  they  had  fewer  years  of 
teaching experience,  suggesting greater teacher turnover in private schools.  This picture is 
remarkably similar to that in the US, where private school salaries are, on average, 40% below 
those in the public  school sector but where,  despite  this,  private  schools employ a greater 
proportion  of  graduates  of  the  better  colleges  than  do  public  schools,  though  they  also 
experience considerably higher rates of teacher turnover than those in public schools (Ballou, 
1996, p.126)3.   Table 2 shows that there is also less dispersion of pay in the public sector. This 
suggests either greater uniformity in the characteristics of teachers in publicly funded schools 
or  that  government-paid  teachers’  salaries  respond  much  less  to  idiosyncratic  differences 
between teachers and are more administratively determined.   
2 In Kansal’s (1990) study on 233 teachers in New Delhi schools, wages in private schools were 42% 
lower  than  in  government  schools  and  in  Govinda  and Varghese’s  (1993)  study of  111 teachers  in  Madhya 
Pradesh, they were 45% lower.  Papola and Rodgers (1992) find that in India most small employers (less than 10 
workers) do not pay the prescribed minimum wages. Many private junior schools - which are small and typically 
employ less than 10 teachers – pay salaries that are a fraction of those paid in government funded schools.  Mann 
and Kapoor (1988) find that  in  all  wage employment  the differential  in  private and public  sector  wages  for 
comparable employees is 31%. 
3 Ballou (1996) finds that US public schools screen out applicants from the best-rated US colleges but 
that this is not the case in private schools.  He considers what plausible explanation can be given for this sub-
optimal teacher recruitment policy in public schools and suggests that school administrators may attach much 
greater importance to applicants’ affective characteristics than to cognitive ability.  He concludes that “the 
persistence of sub-optimal practices is likely due to the fact that public schools are quasi monopolies with only 
limited accountability to the public they serve”.  
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We measure  teacher  status  (S)  by  three  variables:  the  teacher’s  union-membership 
status, whether teacher has a permanent contract as opposed to a short-term appointment4, and 
teacher gender.  So, in the teacher pay equation, i.e. equation (1), S = {UNION, PERMANENT, MALE). 
We  measure  human  capital  (H)  by  three  variables:  the  teacher’s  years  of  education,  her 
experience  in  teaching  and  whether  she  received  pre-service  teacher  training.  So  in  the 
teacher’s pay equation H = {TEDUYRS, TOTEXP, TRAINING}. We measure the quality of the teacher 
by four variables: the average division (or grade) that the teacher obtained in his various board 
examinations and degrees; number of grades/classes he teaches; whether the subject he teaches 
matches the subject of his own specialization and training; and whether he took most of his 
board examinations as a regular candidate5.  So QT  ={DIVISION,  NCLTAUT,  SUBMATCH,  REGEXAM}. 
School quality is measured by three variables: the number of minutes of academic instruction, 
the resources available to the school and its status as a junior or secondary school.  So QS 
={MINACAD,  RESOURCE,  JHS}.  We would  argue  that  this  range  of  variables  gives  us  excellent 
controls for the human capital characteristics of the teachers, their quality, and the quality of 
the school. If with these controls achievement impacts on pay, we would argue that it is not due 
to achievement being a proxy for these quality dimensions of the teachers or school.  We turn 
now to how we measure the characteristics of the students. 
Table  3  shows the  characteristics  of  the  students,  again  classified  by whether  they 
belong  to  a  government  or  private  school.  The  achievement  score  is  the  average  of 
standardized cognitive tests in numeracy and literacy. The numeracy score varies from 0 to 36 
4 The variable permanent seems to mean two different things in the public and private sectors.  In the 
public sector, a duly appointed teacher by definition has a job for life, though temporary teachers are occasionally 
appointed on low pay on an ad hoc basis to fill a vacancy that arises which awaits filling via administrative 
channels in due course.  However, in the private school sector, teachers on an indefinite job contract (as opposed 
to a fixed term, usually annually renewable, contract) consider themselves as ‘permanent’.
5 Board examinations in India can be taken by an individual either as a regular candidate or ‘privately’. 
People following a particular degree or qualification who are enrolled in college or university are called regular 
candidates but those who take the examination after self-study (and are not enrolled in college or university for 
routine attendance of lectures or classes) are called private candidates.  Private candidacy involves little or no 
interaction with a formal teacher to prepare for examination.  Working people who wish to enhance their 
educational qualifications and those with no nearby access to college are more likely to take examinations 
privately.  Taking exams ‘privately’ should not be confused with studying in a private school or college.
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and that for literacy from 0 to 29, so the maximum possible achievement score for a student is 
65 and the minimum 0. The ability of the student, R in equation (2), is measured as their score 
on the Raven’s progressive matrices test. This is a test of non-verbal reasoning which has been 
widely used as an indicator of innate ability or intelligence (Boissiere, Knight and Sabot, 1985; 
Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Appleton, 1995; Alderman et. al., 1996).  The test is intended to be 
independent of schooling6. The controls we have for child attributes, QC, are the student’s age, 
gender, educational aspirations, hours of study at home per week, minutes taken to travel to 
school  each  day,  whether  child  works  in  vacations,  takes  private  tuition,  and  number  of 
siblings.   So,  in  equation  (2),  QC ={CHAGE,  MALE,  CEDASP,  HSTUDY,  TRTIME,  VACWRK,  TAKESTU, 
NUMSIB}.  There  are  a  large  number  of  controls  possible  for  parental  attributes:  mother’s 
education, the wealth of the household, number of books in the household, whether parents 
help the child at home in his homework, and the parents’ caste and religion. So QP ={MEDYRS, 
WEALTH, BOOKHOM, PARHELP, LOWCASTE, MUSLIM}.
There is clear evidence from Table 3 that private school students come from richer and 
more educated homes: the wealth index is nearly three times higher in the private sector and 
the average education of the mothers of students is over 50 per cent higher. They also have 
higher ability measured by the Raven’s test: the test score is 36 in the private and 27 in the 
government sector. Private schools also have nearly twice the volume of resources per student 
as  government  schools  and  their  students  get  taught  for  longer.  It  is  clearly  possible  that 
government and private schools differ not only in their level of resources and student quality 
but in their teaching technology. In particular we would expect that if performance related pay 
is a means of improving student outcomes, for given levels of resources, it will be observed in 
6 Appleton (1995) reports that in early critical evaluations of the Raven’s progressive matrices test, 
assessors argued that “it is as nearly culture-free as any other available test is or can be” and that “it may be said to 
have done as well as possible to avoid the effects of previous learning and established attitudes”.   More recently 
there has been some debate about the extent to which the Raven’s ability test is exogenous to achievement 
(Alderman et. al., 1996).  
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the private rather than the government sector. We therefore estimate the pay and achievement 
functions separately for the two sectors.  
3 The Determinants of Teacher Pay and Student Achievement
Table  4  reports  the  results  of  earning  functions  for  teachers  for  both  the  government  and 
private sector. In the equations we control for teacher status (the S vector described above), 
human capital attributes (the H vector described above), and teacher and school quality (the QT 
and QS vectors described above). We ask which of these factors determine pay and if schools 
with higher student achievement do pay their teachers more. 
Table 4, columns [1] and [3], provide the answer to this question with no allowance for 
possible endogeneity. While in the government sector unionisation has a positive effect on pay, 
in  the  private  sector  unionised  teachers  are  paid  less.  Relatively  few private  teachers  are 
unionised and we interpret this as a quality control effect in private schools, only  very poor 
quality teachers who are unionised work in the private sector. Permanence of job-contract is 
not rewarded in the government sector but is in the private sector. It is likely that in the public 
sector permanency of contract is mandated for every teacher but that the private sector offers 
permanency to attract or retain good teachers. Gender has a small effect on pay in both sectors. 
In neither sector does teacher education level significantly affect salary. Teacher experience is 
not rewarded in the private sector but it  is in the public sector, with the expected concave 
relationship. Pre-service teacher training has statistically highly significant but modest payoffs 
in the private school pay structure but not in the government pay structure. None of the teacher 
quality variables matter to teacher pay in the government sector, but in the private sector some 
aspects of quality are reasonably significant,  given the small  sample size.  Some aspects of 
school quality matter a lot. The length of the school week has a positive and significant effect 
on teacher pay in the private sector but not in the public. Junior High Schools (JHS) in the 
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private sector pay their teachers substantially less than secondary schools but this is not the 
case in the public sector. Finally, the variable of most interest, after controlling for all others, is 
the average student achievement variable. There is a highly significant effect from achievement 
onto pay for private, but not for government, schools.  Clearly the two sectors are using very 
different means of rewarding their teachers. 
Before turning to the issue as to whether this result can be given a causal interpretation 
we consider the OLS results for the student achievement function in Table 5 columns [1] and 
[3].  These  are  the  OLS  estimates  for  equation  (2)  where  we  control  for  ability,  R;  the 
characteristics of the student and their parents, QC  and QP respectively; and the quality of the 
school, QS. In both private and government schools student ability, as measured by the Raven 
test, has a highly significant, and virtually identical, affect on achievement. Both student and 
parental  characteristics  affect  achievement  although  the  parental  attributes  seem  more 
important for the government than the private sector. In the government sector the volume of 
school  resources,  teaching  time  and  non-labour  resources  matter  for  achievement,  for  the 
private sector they do not. It appears from the OLS results that a different teaching technology 
is being used between the government and private sectors. These OLS results show that teacher 
pay has a highly significant effect on achievement for the private, but not government, sector. 
We now turn  to  the  central  issue  with  which  we are  concerned.  Can these  results 
showing  that  pay  and  achievement  are  linked  in  the  private  sector  be  given  a  causal 
interpretation?  Given the expectation that β5 in equation (1) and α5 in equation (2) are both 
positive, we would expect the OLS estimate of each to be upwardly biased. The identification 
of causal effects rests on finding appropriate instruments for average student achievement in 
the teacher pay regression and for average teacher pay in the student achievement regression.7. 
7 Two conditions must be fulfilled for the identification of causal effects using instrumental variables 
(Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996), for example when testing whether teacher pay has a causal effect on student 
achievement.   Firstly, the correlation of the instrument of teacher pay with the error term in the achievement 
equation should be zero and, secondly, the covariance of teacher pay and the instrument of teacher pay should be 
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Given the different levels of aggregation of the two equations, it is not possible to set up a 
simultaneous equation system.  
Table 4 columns [2] and [4] instrument student achievement. We experimented with a 
range  of  instruments,  choosing  as  instruments  variables  from  the  vector  of  student 
characteristics  - the student’s hours of study at home, educational aspirations, whether he/she 
does any vacation work or takes private home tuition – which are known to affect achievement 
but  cannot  be  regarded  as  factors  relevant  for  teacher  pay.  Table  5  columns  [2]  and  [4] 
instrument teacher pay.  Again we experimented choosing as instruments dimensions of the 
status and human capital of teachers - teacher’s experience, gender, union membership and 
permanent/temporary status8. These variables determine pay but can be regarded as exogenous 
for achievement.  We test  for the validity of the instruments by means of the Sargan over-
identifying test.
Comparing  Columns  [3]  and [4]  in  both Tables  4  and 5  we see  that  the  effect  of 
instrumenting is to reduce the size of achievement on pay, and that of pay on achievement, but 
in both cases there remains a significant effect in the private sector. How large is the effect? 
According to Table 4, an increase in achievement from one standard deviation below the mean 
to one standard deviation above raises private school teacher pay by 80%.  According to Table 
5, increasing private teacher pay from one standard deviation below mean pay to one standard 
deviation above raises student achievement by 22%.  
significantly different from zero. Similarly for the case when testing whether schools pay performance-related 
pay, i.e. when average student achievement is the endogenous variable in the teacher pay regression.
8 Since the instruments for pupil achievement to be included in the teacher pay equation have to be 
school-level variables, the first stage equation of student achievement is run in the aggregate form, i.e. aggregating 
all child variables across students within a school.   This implies the availability of only 20 school level 
observations in the government sector and 10 school-level observations in the private sector.  Consequently, we 
were unable to include the whole vector of student variables as our set of instruments.  We used the student 
variables most well correlated with achievement as identifying instruments for achievement.  Similarly, teacher 
characteristics are first averaged over all sample teachers within a school before being assigned to each sample 
student in the school.  This again implies that only a few variables can be used as instruments for teacher pay 
given the fewness of degrees of freedom.
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There appears to be strong evidence both that there is performance related pay in the 
private  sector  and  that  such  pay  impacts  on  student  achievement.  In  the  next  section  we 
consider possible objections to these results. 
4 Are unobservables important? 
It is possible to argue that some unobserved factor in the achievement equation is biasing our 
estimate of the effects of pay on achievement. We would argue that the most obvious factors, 
which would be unobserved in most data sets, are the quality of the school, or the teacher, or 
the student.  Our data set has an extensive set of controls for each of these attributes and it is 
clear that even with this very full set of controls there is a clear positive effect of wages onto 
achievement in private schools. It could be argued that panel data would be preferable as, by 
construction, this would control for all the unobserved time invariant characteristics of student, 
school and teacher. However, in so far as the teacher pay term in the achievement equation is a 
relative pay term then it may well be a school fixed-effect, so it would be differenced out in 
panel data.  In so far as it is a time-varying factor, using panel data would be preferable only if 
the measurement error associated with changes were sufficiently small to enable the data to 
identify changes of achievement with changes in wages. While panel data would enable the 
analysis  to be pushed further, we would argue that our controls for quality are sufficiently 
comprehensive  to  make  doubtful  an  interpretation  of  the  positive  correlation  as  due  to  a 
common quality factor generating the result. 
We can address the possibility of bias through omitted student ability still further than 
we have so far. In the previous section we argued that we had controlled for student quality by 
direct measures of ability and by numerous variables capturing the parental background of the 
students. It could be argued that a selection corrected model is required to properly allow for 
differences in  the unobserved characteristics of pupils.  As is well  known, such models  are 
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subject to the problem that the results can be sensitive to the exclusion restrictions that are used 
to identify the achievement equation. We experimented with a range of exclusion restrictions. 
The lambda term from the probit was wholly insignificant in all the trials and the size and 
significance  of  the  coefficient  of  pay  was  unaffected9.  This  is  consistent  with  our  earlier 
argument about the adequacy of our controls for ability.   We interpret this as evidence that 
unobserved factors are not inducing a correlation between the error term and the instruments. 
We conclude that there is no evidence that our result is due to a failure to allow for omitted 
variables due to the selection of higher quality or more motivated students into private schools. 
5 Interpreting the results for achievement 
We have argued that  for private  schools there is  convincing evidence  for causation 
running from teacher’s pay to achievement.  We consider two potential interpretations of this 
result.  The most popular explanation is that salaries proxy for teacher quality: raising wages 
encourages better quality candidates to apply for teaching positions, thereby raising the average 
quality of teachers.  A second interpretation comes from efficiency wage theory.  Under this, 
higher wages improve student achievement by increasing teacher effort at any given level of 
teacher quality.    
We test  first  for the teacher  quality  interpretation.   We have already included as  a 
measure of teacher quality the average division (or grade) that  the teacher  obtained in her 
various board/degree examinations.  But it is arguable that there are several other dimensions 
of teacher quality, such as years of education, experience and pre-service training.  If we find 
that inclusion of other teacher quality measures in the achievement production function reduces 
the size and significance of the wage coefficient, then the effect of wages on achievement can 
be interpreted as occurring via higher wages raising teacher quality.  We find, however, that 
9 The results are available from the authors.  Kingdon’s (1996b) study found that when controlling for 
selectivity of students into private and public schools, the selectivity term lambda was weakly significant (t=1.8 in 
private and t=-1.8 in the government) achievement functions when there were no controls for any school or 
teacher variables. 
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inclusion of teacher quality controls in the achievement function in Table 6, column [1], does 
not reduce the coefficient on the wage variable10.  This suggests that wage is not capturing the 
effect of teacher quality.  The low correlation between wages and conventional measures of 
teacher quality may not be surprising.  While higher wages are likely to attract better quality 
people into the pool of applicants for teaching jobs, sub-optimal hiring practices may mean that 
the best applicants are not recruited, in which case higher salaries need not increase average 
teacher quality. According to Ballou (1996), higher wages in US public schools (than in private 
schools) do not lead to the recruitment of better quality teachers there due to inefficient hiring 
practices in the public sector11.  
Can the  estimated  achievement  function  be  given  an  interpretation  in  terms  of  the 
literature on efficiency wages? Efficiency wage theory predicts that when monitoring worker 
effort  is  difficult,  paying  a worker higher than his  opportunity wage elicits  greater  worker 
effort and higher effort is labor augmenting.  In the test for efficiency wages that have used 
production  functions  (e.g.  Levine,  1992)  the  Solow condition  has  been  used  to  test  if  the 
coefficient on labor input is the same as the coefficient on the wage term12. We can carry out a 
similar test with our model.  The test for efficiency wages is that the coefficient on the wage 
10 While the 2SLS result in Table 5 tested for the possibility that the OLS coefficient on LNPAY is high 
due to endogeneity bias, the logic here is to see whether the OLS coefficient on LNPAY in Table 5 is high due to 
omitted variable bias, i.e. due to the fact that aspects of teacher quality are missing in Table 5.  We experimented 
with including several different teacher quality variables other than total experience, years of teacher training and 
average division/grade obtained in the teacher’s various examinations.  These were years of teacher’s education, 
square of teaching experience, subject matches the one taught, and whether teacher took exams as a regular 
candidate.  It was not possible to include all of these variables together given the fewness of degrees of freedom as 
there are only 10 private schools in the sample.  In order to conserve degrees of freedom we collapsed the two 
separate variables MINACAD and CLNUM into one variable, PPMINACAD which is per pupil minutes of 
academic instruction per week.  In none of these experiments did the coefficient on wage fall below 0.30 and it 
continued to be significant at the 1% level.
11 Teacher quality was measured by the selectivity of the college that the teacher attended.  Hanushek, 
Kain and Rivkin (1999) find that higher district starting salary had little relationship with the average district test 
score of newly recruited teachers in certification exams in Texas in mid-1990s.  This does not however imply bad 
hiring practices because test scores in certification exams were not well correlated with student achievement 
scores.
12 According to efficiency wage theory, firms that pay high wages are predicted to have higher 
productivity from high worker effort, low turnover etc. and employers will raise wages until the marginal benefit 
of higher wages (in terms of increased productivity) balances the increase in the wage bill. The test used by 
Levine and replicated here tests the fundamental implication of efficiency wage theory that marginal wage 
increases raise productivity sufficiently to pay for themselves.  
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term should equal the coefficient on the time input per student. In Table 6 column [2] we report 
the results of using a measure of labor input per student  (PPMINACAD), which is equal to the 
minutes of academic instruction provided per week (MINACAD) divided by class size (CLNUM). 
We test if the restriction implied by this particular form of the test for efficiency wages is met, 
namely that the coefficient on PPMINACAD and LNPAY are the same. It is clear from the regression 
that the restriction is accepted.  This result permits the interpretation that in the private sector 
not only does pay impact on achievement but the private sector sets wages to elicit the optimal 
level of effort from the teachers. 
6 Summary and Conclusions
Clearly the results reported in this paper need to be qualified. In any comparison across schools 
the possibility  that  results  are  sensitive to  the unobservable  characteristics  of the school  is 
important. We do not have panel data so we cannot use a school dummy to control for all the 
time invariant effects of the school. However our data set does allow controls for what have 
been regarded as the most  important  differences  across  schools,  such as  resources,  teacher 
quality,  student ability and home background.  Private schools in our Indian data have a far 
higher volume of resources per student, their  students are more able and the parents of the 
students richer. It is also the case that student achievement is much higher in the private sector. 
Given that the private schools are fee paying, none of this is a surprise. The contribution of this 
paper is to show that students in the private sector do better when their schools pay relatively 
more than similar type of schools - once allowance is made for factors that potentially improve 
pupil achievement in private schools. We considered two interpretations for this result.  The 
first, namely that higher wages proxy for higher quality teachers, was not supported by the 
data.  The second, namely that higher wages motivate higher teacher effort had support in the 
data.   We have argued that this is evidence for an efficiency wage pay structure in Indian 
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private  education.  Monitoring  of  teacher  effort  is  difficult  and  relative  pay  is  effective  at 
eliciting greater effort: performance related pay for teachers in private schools in India does 
improve student performance.
It  would be wrong to surmise  from the results  of this  paper  that  increasing teacher 
salaries across-the-board is a good way of motivating teacher effort.  Under the efficiency wage 
hypothesis,  there must be fear of losing a well-paid job in order for higher wages to elicit 
higher effort.   In private  schools,  the flexibility of managers  to set  wages and dismiss  lax 
teachers means that efficiency wages are an incentive lever that managers can use to enhance 
teacher incentives.    Since government-funded teaching jobs in India are mostly permanent 
contracts  with  little  chance  of  dismissal,  efficiency  wages  are  not  available  as  an  effort-
motivating device in the public school sector.      
15
TABLE 1  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Teacher status
UNION Member of a teacher union Y=1; N=0
PERMANENT Permanent status Y=1; N=0
TESEX Teacher is male Y=1; N=0
Teacher human capital
TEDUYRS Teacher’s education in years
TOTEXP Teaching experience in years
EXPSQ Experience squared
TRAINING Pre-service Training Y=1; N=0
Teacher quality
DIVISION Index of teacher quality. It is the average division/grade she obtained in her various degree and board 
exams, after assigning a value of 3 to first, 2 to second and 1 to third division. 
NCLTAUT Number of grades taught
SUBMATCH Teaches subject of her specialization Y=1; N=0
REGEXAM Teacher took most of her board exams as a Regular candidate? Y=1; N=0
Teacher pay
GROSSPAY Pay (rupees per month)
LNPAY Log of pay
School quality
JHS Junior high school=1; Secondary school=0
MINACAD Minutes of academic instruction per week
CLNUM Class size
RESOURCE
Index of school resources. The index was constructed by giving a value of 1 for each of seventeen 
facilities such as availability of desks and chairs, blackboards, chalk, charts, playground, toilet, 
drinking water, musical instruments and educational equipment. 
Child attributes
ACHIEVE Student’s achievement score (total on numeracy and literacy tests)
CHAGE Child’s age (in months)
MALE Child’s gender MALE=1; FEMALE=0
CEDASP Child’s educational aspirations: index from 1 to 6 of the highest level to which child aspires, e.g. 1=up to grade 8; 2=up to grade 10; 4=first degree, etc.
HSTUDY Weekly hours of home study 
TRTIME Travel time to school (minutes)
VACWRK Child works out of school hours
TAKESTU Student has private home tuition
NUMSIB Number of siblings
Child ability
SRAVEN Score on Raven’s test of ability or intelligence
Parental attributes
PARHELP Parents help with studies at home Y=1; N=0
MEDYRS Mother’s education in years
MEDYRSQ MEDYRS squared
WEALTH
Index of household wealth. The variable was constructed by assigning the following values to owned 
assets:  Car=50, scooter=15, video=15, fridge=6, telephone=5, TV=3, tape recorder, gas cooker=2 
each and radio, bed(s), bicycle, and clock=1 each.  
WEALTHSQ WEALTH squared
BOOKHOM1 Less than or equal to 50 books in the house Y=1; N=0
BOOKHOM2 More than 50 books in the house Y=1; N=0
BOOKHOM3 More than 100 books in the house Y=1; N=0
LOWCASTE Belongs to low caste Y=1; N=0
MUSLIM Religion is Muslim Y=1; N=0
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TABLE 2  TEACHER PAY EQUATION VARIABLES
Govt. Private
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Teacher status
UNION* Member of a union 0.84 0.37 0.06 0.24
PERMANENT* Permanent status 0.96 0.19 0.69 0.47
TESEX* Teacher is male 0.47 0.50 0.16 0.37
Teacher human capital
TEDUYRS Teacher’s education in years 14.89 1.36 15.28 1.08
TOTEXP Teaching experience in years 17.01 8.32 11.60 9.15
EXPSQ Experience squared 357.85 322.37 216.97 288.71
TRAINING* Pre-service Training 0.97 0.17 0.87 0.34
Teacher quality
DIVISION Index of teacher quality 1.75 0.38 2.06 0.40
NCLTAUT Number of grades taught 3.48 1.38 3.66 1.56
SUBMATCH* Teaches specialization 0.46 0.50 0.61 0.49
REGEXAM* Regular exam candidate? 0.72 0.45 0.94 0.24
Teacher pay
GROSSPAY Pay (rupees per month) 2482 329 1533 762
LNPAY Log of pay 7.80 0.23 7.15 0.68
School quality
JHS* Junior high school 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50
MINACAD Minutes of academic instruction per week 1157 152 1482 367
CLNUM Class size 35.28 17.32 41.22 7.38
RESOURCE Index of school resources 5.84 2.90 11.94 3.20
Student achievement
ACHIEVE
Average achievement score of 
class 8 students taught by the 
teacher
16.94 4.90 33.70 7.55
Number of Observations 104 67
Note: Variables marked with an asterisk (*) are 0/1 variables so that their mean represents the proportion of 1’s.
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TABLE 3  STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT EQUATION VARIABLES
Govt. Private
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Child achievement
ACHIEVE Student’s achievement score 19.00 8.38 33.79 10.5
Child ability
SRAVEN Score on Raven’s ability test 26.87 10.10 36.03 10.6
Child attributes
CHAGE Child’s age (in months) 163.91 14.58 164.31 11.1
MALE* Proportion of male students 0.46 0.50 0.63 0.5
CEDASP Child’s educational aspirations 4.23 1.38 5.06 1.1
HSTUDY Weekly hours of home study 19.69 10.16 24.51 10.7
TRTIME Travel time to school (minutes) 17.48 11.73 17.76 11.93
VACWRK* Child works out of school hours 0.18 0.38 0.09 0.29
TAKESTU* Student has private home tuition 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45
NUMSIB Number of siblings 4.46 1.70 3.28 1.45
Parental attributes
PARHELP* Parents help with studies at home 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.48
MEDYRS Mother’s education in years/10 0.71 0.46 1.11 0.45
MEDYRSQ MEDYRS squared 0.71 0.64 1.43 0.81
WEALTH Index of household wealth/10 1.41 1.09 3.95 2.35
WEALTHSQ WEALTH squared 3.18 5.24 21.09 21.5
BOOKHOM2* More than 50 books in the house 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
BOOKHOM3* More than 100 books in the house 0.20 0.40 0.44 0.50
LOWCASTE* Belongs to low caste 0.19 0.40 0.04 0.20
MUSLIM* Religion is Muslim 0.29 0.45 0.12 0.32
Teacher 
variables
DIVISION Index of teacher quality 1.77 0.20 2.05 0.21
LNPAY Log of gross pay 7.80 0.13 7.12 0.65
School quality
JHS* Junior High School 0.29 0.46 0.51 0.50
MINACAD Minutes of academic instruction per week 1161.47 146.14 1454.78 329.30
CLNUM Class size of the sample class 8 44.11 16.49 41.03 8.23
PPMINACAD
Per pupil minutes of academic instruction
per week (MINACAD / CLNUM)
31.63 18.72 37.04 11.27
RESOURCE Index of school resources 6.87 2.79 11.96 3.23
Number of observations 542 360
Note: Variables marked with an asterisk (*) are 0/1 variables so that their mean represents the proportion of 1’s.
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TABLE 4 LN (TEACHERS PAY)
GOVT. PRIVATE
OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERCEPT 6.87 [7.5]*** 6.75 [7.2]*** -0.06 [0.1] -0.49 [0.4]
Teacher status
UNION 0.06 [2.2]** 0.06 [2.2]** -0.54 [4.0]*** -0.53 [3.7]***
PERMANENT 0.38 [1.4] 0.38 [1.3] 0.31 [3.5]*** 0.30 [3.3]***
TESEX -0.06 [1.8]* -0.06 [1.8]* -0.07 [1.8]* -0.08 [2.3]**
Teacher human capital
TEDUYRS/100 0.69 [0.9] 0.79 [1.1] 1.08 [0.8] 1.61 [0.9]
TOTEXP 0.02 [2.9]*** 0.02 [3.0]*** -0.01 [0.8] -0.01 [0.8]
EXPSQ/1000 -0.47 [2.5]** -0.46 [2.5]** 0.39 [1.3] 0.42 [1.2]
TRAINING 0.60 [1.5] 0.59 [1.5] 0.17 [4.2]*** 0.16 [4.4]***
Teacher quality
Ln (DIVISION) 0.07 [0.5] 0.12 [0.5] -0.76 [0.9] -0.52 [0.6]
NCLTAUT -0.01 [1.1] -0.01 [1.1] -0.02 [1.7] -0.02 [1.7]
SUBMATCH/100 0.32 [0.1] 0.22 [0.1] 4.91 [1.5] 5.48 [1.6]
REGUEXAM -0.04 [0.8] -0.04 [0.9] 0.19 [0.9] 0.22 [1.1]
School quality
JHS -0.07 [1.6] -0.09 [1.2] -0.47 [3.5]*** -0.45 [2.9]**
Ln (MINACAD) -0.09 [0.7] -0.06 [0.5] 0.27 [1.7] 0.38 [1.9]*
Ln (RESOURCE) -0.05 [1.6] -0.04 [1.3] 0.05 [0.3] 0.11 [0.5]
Student achievement
Ln (ACHIEVE) 0.17 [1.3] 0.11 [0.7] 1.52 [5.8]*** 1.30 [3.2]***
N 104 104 67 67
R2 0.56 0.55 0.95 0.95
Sargan [p value] 0.16 0.23
Robust t-values are in [ ] parentheses, allowing for correlation between observations from the same school. 
In column [2] the instruments used for Ln(ACHIEVE) were CHAGE, HSTUDY and CEDASP.
In column [4] the instruments used for Ln(ACHIEVE) were VACWRK and TAKESTU. 
* represents significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
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TABLE 5   LN (STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT)
GOVT. PRIVATE
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
INTERCEPT -1.55 [0.9] -1.87 [1.0] -0.05 [0.1] -0.41 [0.6]
Student ability
Ln (SRAVEN) 0.26 [4.2]*** 0.26 [4.3]*** 0.24 [6.4]*** 0.25 [7.7]***
Student attributes
CHAGE/100 -0.43 [2.7]** -0.43 [2.7]** -0.21 [0.9] -0.22 [0.9]
MALE 0.10 [2.1]** 0.10 [2.2]** 0.17 [3.3]*** 0.15 [2.8]**
CEDASP/100 -0.62 [0.6] -0.65 [0.6] 2.77 [1.5] 2.96 [1.6]
HSTUDY/100 0.52 [2.3]** 0.52 [2.2]** 0.34 [3.8]*** 0.29 [3.1]***
TRTIME/100 0.14 [0.7] 0.15 [0.8] 0.00 [0.0] 0.00 [0.1]
VACWRK -0.09 [1.3] -0.09 [1.3] -0.10 [2.0]* -0.10 [2.1]*
TAKESTU/100 -1.80 [0.4] -1.76 [0.4] -8.40 [4.2]*** -8.53 [4.6]***
NUMSIB/100 0.12 [0.1] 0.13 [0.1] -3.49 [2.5]** -3.80 [2.6]**
Parental attributes
PARHELP/100 -3.90 [1.6] -3.88 [1.6] -1.33 [0.3] -2.37 [0.6]
MEDYRS -0.10 [1.1] -0.10 [1.1] -0.07 [0.9] -0.04 [0.5]
MEDYRSQ/100 0.07 [1.0] 0.07 [1.0] 0.04 [1.1] 0.03 [0.8]
WEALTH 0.16 [2.7]** 0.16 [2.7]** 0.03 [0.9] 0.04 [1.0]
WEALTHSQ/100 -2.29 [2.1]* -2.30 [2.1]** -2.20 [0.7] -2.70 [0.9]
BOOKHOM2 0.06 [1.3] 0.06 [1.3] 0.00 [0.1] 0.01 [0.3]
BOOKHOM3 0.09 [2.7]** 0.09 [2.7]** 0.03 [0.8] 0.04 [1.1]
LOWCASTE -0.16 [3.3]*** -0.15 [3.3]*** -0.03 [0.4] -0.02 [0.2]
MUSLIM -0.05 [1.2] -0.05 [1.2] 0.01 [0.2] 0.01 [0.3]
School and teacher quality
JHS -0.28 [4.9]*** -0.28 [4.6]*** 0.34 [4.4]*** 0.34 [4.2]***
Ln (DIVISION) 0.53 [2.1]* 0.51 [2.0]* 1.69 [3.2]*** 2.08 [4.0]***
Ln (RESOURCE) 0.18 [3.4]*** 0.18 [3.4]*** -0.06 [1.7] -0.00 [0.0]
Ln (MINACAD) 0.50 [3.1]*** 0.50 [3.1]*** -0.02 [0.2] 0.14 [1.1]
Ln (CLNUM) -0.12 [1.8]* -0.12 [1.6] -0.13 [0.9] -0.25 [1.9]*
Teacher pay
Ln (PAY) 0.05 [0.2] 0.09 [0.4] 0.30 [5.8]*** 0.18 [2.5]**
N 542 542 360 360
R2 0.4307 0.4306 0.6375 0.6339
Sargan [p value] 0.2860 0.1058
Robust t-values in [ ] parentheses, allowing for correlation between observations from the same school.  In column [2] the 
instruments used for Ln(PAY) were TOTEXP and UNION.  In column [4] the instruments used for Ln(PAY) were 
PERMANENT and TESEX.  * represents significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
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TABLE 6   LN (ACHIEVEMENT) FOR PRIVATE SECTOR ONLY 
[1] [2]
INTERCEPT -0.90 [1.5] -0.77 [1.0]
Student ability
Ln (SRAVEN) 0.23 [6.1]*** 0.25 [7.6]***
Student attributes
CHAGE/100 -0.22 [1.6] -0.19 [0.8]
MALE 0.15 [4.6]*** 0.15 [2.9]**
CEDASP/100 2.89 [2.4]** 2.93 [1.6]
HSTUDY/100 0.31 [2.5]** 0.27 [3.0]**
TRTIME/100 0.01 [0.1] 0.01 [0.1]
VACWRK -0.10 [2.3]** -0.10 [2.1]**
TAKESTU/100 -7.01 [2.3]** -7.93 [3.9]**
NUMSIB/100 -3.39 [3.2]*** -3.86 [2.7]**
Parental attributes
PARHELP/100 -1.15 [0.4] -2.30 [0.7]
MEDYRS -0.03 [0.3] -0.03 [0.3]
MEDYRSQ/100 1.48 [0.3] 2.60 [0.7]
WEALTH 0.03 [1.3] 0.04 [1.0]
WEALTHSQ/100 -0.22 [0.9] -0.27 [0.8]
BOOKHOM2 0.01 [0.3] 0.01 [0.4]
BOOKHOM3 0.04 [1.1] 0.05 [1.1]
LOWCASTE -0.04 [0.7] -0.02 [0.3]
MUSLIM 0.01 [0.3] 0.01 [0.4]
School and teacher quality
JHS 0.36 [5.2]*** 0.32 [5.4]***
Ln (DIVISION) 1.76 [3.3]*** 1.87 [5.2]***
Ln (RESOURCE) -0.09 [1.0] 0.001 [0.0]
Ln (PPMINACAD) 0.15 [1.1] 0.18 [4.8]***
TOTEXP/100 0.26 [0.7]
TRAINING -0.26 [1.4]
Teacher pay
Ln (PAY) 0.30 [4.6]*** 0.18 [4.8]***
RESTRICT 0.0022 [0.0] **
N 360 360
R2 0.62 0.63
Sargan [p value] -- 0.075
Robust t-values in [ ] parentheses, allowing for correlation between observations from the same school.
Both columns include labor input per pupil instead of total labor input.  Column [2] imposes the restriction, which is accepted, that the 
coefficients on Ln (PPMINACAD) and Ln (PAY) are equal. RESTRICT is the value of the Lagrange multiplier used to impose the 
restriction.  * represents significance at the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% level.  
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